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Welsh Conservatism: The Unexpected Evolution 
 
Alan Convery 
University of Edinburgh 
 
If you had asked any observers of British politics in 1999 where they thought a 
revival of Conservatism was likely to take place, the answer probably would not have 
been Wales. Wales narrowly voted for devolution and the Welsh Conservative Party 
was so closely integrated into British structures that you would have been entitled to 
question whether it was in fact a separate entity at all from the statewide party based 
in London. Scotland had the much more distinguished history of Unionist thought and 
indigenous Conservatism. It is somewhat surprising therefore that 14 years after the 
creation of the devolved institutions, the Scottish Conservative Party is asking 
whether it has lessons to learn from its Welsh colleagues. Although it is important not 
to exaggerate the revival of the Welsh Conservatives, it is clear that they have adapted 
to devolution much better than the Scottish Conservatives. After examining some 
Welsh Tory success, this essay suggests three key factors that helped them to find a 
distinctively Welsh and Conservative approach to devolution: the obvious 
deficiencies in the Welsh devolution settlement in 1999; the possibility of being in 
government in Wales; and the presence at the top of the party of a group of revisionist 
thinkers. 
 Since devolution, the Welsh Conservatives have gradually increased their 
representation in Cardiff and at Westminster. They now have 14 members of the 
Welsh Assembly, compared to just 9 in 1999; they also have 8 UK Members of 
Parliament in Westminster, compared to none in 1997, whereas the Scottish 
Conservatives have only regained one MP since the low point in 1997. It would 
however be misleading to present the progress gained in Wales as natural and 
inevitable. The Welsh Conservatives’ first manifesto for the Welsh Assembly in 1999 
did not suggest that they were a party at ease with devolution. On the contrary, it 
emphasised the dangers of the EU and of further devolution leading to the break-up of 
the UK. It reiterated the policy positions adopted under the last Conservative 
government. The Scottish Conservative manifesto in 1999 harboured a more open and 
constructive perspective on the new constitutional arrangements. 
Later Welsh manifestos in 2003 and 2007, in contrast, adopted a much more 
positive tone and emphasised investment in public services and enhancement of 
Welsh identity and influence. This commitment to Welsh distinctiveness is a key 
theme that the party has pursued since Nick Bourne took over as leader from Rod 
Richards in 1999. ‘Welshification’ is an ugly word, but it perhaps best describes the 
strategy adopted by party elites over the past decade. What factors made such a 
change of direction possible? 
 First, the most obvious way in which the Welsh Conservatives were able to 
get into the debate was on the question of the devolution settlement itself. It was not 
necessary to be a member of Plaid Cymru in order to conclude that the balance of 
powers in 1999 was inadequate. The Welsh Conservatives were therefore able to 
support further powers for the Welsh Assembly without it seeming like a concession 
to nationalists or a dilution of their commitment to the Union. This led eventually to 
the position where nearly all elected Conservatives in Wales campaigned for a ‘yes’ 
vote in the 2011 referendum on strengthening Welsh devolution. 
 Secondly, unlike in Scotland, the Welsh Conservatives were able to see a path 
towards government. If, as some have argued, the Conservative Party exists to be in 
power, then this is a powerful incentive to reform. The Welsh party system was such 
that any government in the Welsh Assembly that did not involve the Labour Party 
would have to include the Conservatives in order to have a majority. Thus, if the 
Conservatives wanted to be in government in Wales, they would have to be a viable 
coalition partner for two parties on the centre left: Plaid Cymru and the Liberal 
Democrats. The Conservatives concluded negotiations and were on the cusp of 
forming such a government in 2007. Indeed, they had changed so much that John 
Osmond concluded: ‘With the Welsh Conservatives Plaid Cymru now has a serious 
challenger in terms of identity politics.’ The prospect of being in government 
provided a goal and a rationale for changing the party. It is much more difficult to 
justify changes in a context where a party is simply attempting to be a more 
competent opposition. 
 Finally, the Welsh Conservatives were able to take advantage of these 
incentives because elites at the top of the party grasped the opportunity to change. The 
leader, Nick Bourne AM, and the chief policy adviser, David Melding AM, concluded 
that the only way for the Welsh Conservatives to prosper was to wholeheartedly 
embrace devolution and cultivate a distinctively Welsh image. Thus, in stark contrast 
to the 1999 manifesto that seemed hostile to devolution, the party gradually came to 
emphasise its commitment to Welsh distinctiveness and moderated positions on key 
issues like health and education. Nick Bourne’s foreword to the 2007 manifesto 
stresses the need to invest in public services. Such sentiments prompted one 
Conservative councillor to complain that: ‘I can’t get a good number of people out 
working on the campaign. This is a wet, liberal manifesto that they don’t want to sell 
on the doorstep.’ Crucially, party elites tried to place themselves on the centre right of 
a Welsh, as opposed to a British, political spectrum. They began to see Cardiff, not 
Westminster, as the party’s main focus. 
 This has sparked revisionist Conservative thought in other areas. Having voted 
‘no’ to Welsh devolution in 1997, David Melding AM is now the leading 
Conservative thinker on how the party should respond to devolution not only in Wales 
but also in the rest of the UK. His book, The Reformed Union, which argues that the 
Conservatives should support federalism, is the most sophisticated attempt to imagine 
a Conservative future for the UK. It has also received support from Murdo Fraser 
MSP in Scotland. The language of federalism potentially provides a new way for 
Conservatives to talk about the United Kingdom, making it seem like a modern 
constitutional approach to working together, rather than a historical accident.  
 In electoral terms, the Welsh Conservatives’ new approach appears to have 
paid off (although of course it is difficult to attribute direct cause and effect), as the 
party has seen a steady rise in support. In addition to a rising number of MPs and 
AMs, a particular highlight was the 2009 European Parliament elections, in which the 
Welsh Conservatives topped the poll. This success helped to sustain a narrative about 
the effect of the party elites’ strategy. The ban on dual candidacy in Wales combined 
with the Conservatives’ increasing vote share resulted in the leader, Nick Bourne AM, 
losing his seat in 2011. 
However, there remain tensions in Welsh Conservatism. They have not yet 
been able to agree a common position on more powers for the Welsh Assembly. 
Although most elected Welsh Conservatives supported a ‘yes’ vote in the 2011 
referendum, they were not obliged to do so by a common party position. Moreover, 
the party still lacks formal autonomy from the centre. The leader of the Welsh 
Conservatives is still technically David Cameron, not Andrew R.T. Davies in Cardiff. 
As Welsh devolution evolves, it will be interesting to see how the party balances 
different Conservative opinions about strengthening the Assembly and creating a 
more autonomous party structure. The abrupt cancellation of the Welsh Conservative 
Party conference in 2012 suggests that the party still has work to do in establishing 
itself as a distinct and serious force within the Conservative Party. 
The journey of the Welsh Conservatives also underlines wider points about the 
Conservative Party’s attitude to devolution. As in Scotland, the central UK party 
remains mostly relaxed about sub-state party autonomy, provided it does not interfere 
with the main objective of achieving a majority government at Westminster. In 
addition, ironically, the lack of attention paid at the centre to creating distinct Welsh 
party structures might have helped party elites. The absence of a powerful party 
central office bureaucracy (which had existed in Scotland for many years and was 
been retained after devolution) and the creation of a relatively weak Welsh Party 
Board resulted in fewer constraints for the leadership in the Assembly. In promising 
further powers for the Assembly, the Welsh Conservatives must also rely on decisions 
made at the centre of the party about how much it is prepared to devolve. 
 The unexpected success of the Welsh Conservatives stands out as an example 
of how British Conservatism can adapt to new circumstances while retaining a 
commitment to the Union. The political opportunity structure in Wales clearly 
provided a more favourable context for rethinking Conservatism than is the case in 
Scotland and it is important not to exaggerate aspects of their success. However, 
crucially, the Welsh Conservative Party had elected politicians who were prepared to 
think creatively about their response to the changing nature of the UK. This has been 
the key to their success. 
